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The 1980's brought about a revival of Political Theory, and within
that, of the Theory of Democracy. From various different interests and
perspectives, descriptive and prescriptive questions related to basic values,
empirical phenomena or the most influencial factors in the transition towards
liberal democratic political systems have been studied with a renewed
emphasis. Obviously, the collapse of the socialist states of Eastern Europe
has reinforced even more the re-emergence of the Theory of Democracy, up
to the point we can say that today it has become one of the most important
issues within the field of Political Science.
Without going into metatheoretical questions about the reasons that have
caused this phenomenon -such as the relocation of the welfare state since the
1970's, the developments of particular neo-marxist theories, the literature
concerning neocorporatism or political parties and social movements, the
influence of several authors with a strong ethical perspective (Rawls,
Habermas, Foucault, etc.)-, in this paper I would like to highlight the
convenience of renewing the classic contrast between the liberal ideas and
practices with respect to democratic ideas and practices within the liberal
democratic paradigm. Convenience that has as much theoretical meaning as
practical, that is to say, referring as much to the analytical clarification and
accuracy of the main concepts and values used by the different theories of
democracy, as referring to the result of empirical political processes.
With this objective in mind I will take the work of Schumpeter as
"leitmotiv" of the discussion of the Theory of Democracy. Almost fifty years
after the publication of Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (1942) this work
continues to be a required reference for the aforementioned theory. Although it
is only considered as a highly intelligent "after-dinner chat", as Jon Elster
comments following Robbins (Elster 1983), it would continue being a "classic"
after-dinner chat, at least when presenting some cultural aspects of the crisis
of capitalism or in analysing the limits and possibilities of the different theories
of Democracy.
In Schumpeter's work we are interested above all in two central
ideas: the theory that capitalism has structural components that make it the
victim of its own success, and his notion of "another theory" of Democracy,
more recently titled in different ways -competitive theory, economic or elitist
theory, etc.- and its contraposition to a supposed "classical doctrine" of
Democracy.
In the first section of this paper I will refer to the question of whether
the schumpeterian analysis commits or not some fallacies in its arguments,
such as the fallacy pars pro toto in relation to notions of capitalism and
modernization, the fallacy of the hasty generalization, or what we can describe
as the fallacy of abstraction: a theoretical attitude implicit in some of the
political philosophical studies. At the same time, I will question very briefly the
Schumpeterian notion of socialism.
In the second section we will discuss, on the one hand, whether the
contrast alluded to between the "classical" and the "other" theory of
Democracy is currently adequate. I will highlight this contrast from the
weberian perspective of political theory connected with the conceptions of
Schumpeter. On the other hand, I would like to refer to the convenience of
presenting present day liberal democracies as historical products in which
there are three distinct dimensions, each one endowed with an autonomous
logic in contrast to the others.
I. CAPITALISM, MODERNIZATION AND DISCOURSE FALLACIES
Within the area of social sciences, as well as political philosophy,
three distinct fallacies often appear in the arguments: the classic fallacies pars
pro toto and the hasty generalization, and what we characterise as the fallacy
of abstraction.
By fallacy pars pro toto we understand an argument that attributes
exclusive responsibility of some consequences to the somewhat complex
economic or social phenomena, for example capitalism, which in reality,
however, are shared with other phenomena of the same kind, socialism for
example. That is to say, to understand one part of a general phenomena as if
it is the whole.
The second fallacy, for its part, consists of the inference of a
generalization that is too excessive, or founded on a very small sample. Both
fallacies are studied in the area of classical logic (1).
Finally, the fallacy of abstraction refers to the supposition, explicit or
implicit, that a theory possesses a greater explanatory power according to the
degree of abstraction of the categories used in its analysis, without referring to
the real empirical world in more than an intuitive or impoverished mode. It is a
more general fallacy than the previous ones because it refers to the
explanation claims of the discussion and not to a particular argument within it.
In the political field it is a characteristic that affects above all the analyses
produced by the philosophical tradition (Foucault's work about "power" is
possibly a recent example of this. McCarthy 1990).
Benjamin Barber writes:
"Where political science avoided politics without achieving
science, political philosophy avoids politics by achieving
philosophy" (Barber 1988:5)
We can briefly see now if we can attribute or not these fallacies to
Schumpeter when he analyzes some of the “cultural contradictions of
capitalism", contradictions which imply its future substitution by a Socialist
economic organization (I.1). Subsequently, we note one brief consideration
about the concept of Socialism used by Schumpeter (1.2).
(I.1)
Schumpeter's reflections about "the cultural contradictions of
capitalism" have a certain connection with the latter work of D. Bell. The
evolution of this economic system would have brought with it the rupture of
certain elements that were the origin of its efficiency and stability. In this way,
a kind of ancient greek hybris would have been produced, an excess that
would undermine the agents of control, those that act as the sophrosyne of the
system (2).
But Schumpeter is basically an economist. He does not produce any
synthesis of a sociocultural nature, concerning the process of modernization of
Western societies, but he limits himself to remarking some of the
consequences of the "observable tendencies" in the economic system of the
process. Our intention in this section is to comment the equivocal use that is
made of the term "capitalism", sometimes understood in its strict economic
sense and sometimes in a much wider cultural sense nearer to what Weber
understands by modernization. This use should not be critisized in itself but it
can easily lead to erroneous conclusions. In order to discuss this question it
would be useful to determine two brief characterizations, more than definitions,
of what we understand by capitalism and modernization.
By capitalism we understand an economic system based on the
production of individuals, groups or organizations for a market in order to
obtain benefits (Berger 1986). More than "property", whose legal and political
regulation has substantially changed from the beginning of the liberal era, the
main trait of this system is, then, the existence of an effective market.
Modernization is a more comprehensive concept and thus more
difficult to characterize without creating ambiguities. In a general sense, it
consists in a process followed by Western societies in the last two centuries, in
which there have been produced multidimensional articulations and causal
interrelations between, at least, four different areas: economic growth
unknown up to then, the institutionalization of political and legal processes that
have as a basic core the organizational principles of political liberalism, the
cultural changes associated with the development of the illustrated concept of
reason, and, above all, the technological revolution at the heart of the
processes of industrialization. Thus one is dealing with a complex
phenomenon of great extent, and that in strict sense affects only some of the
countries of the world linked to the European cultural tradition.
Characterising both terms in this sense, capitalism, as an economic
system, is one part of modernization. But there could also be modernization
with other economic organizations in society (e.g. socialism). And from a
linguistic point of view, we can conclude that not all what is related to the
global phenomena can be related to each of its components. Nor viceversa.
The analysis of social sciences can delimit those phenomena that must be
associated to the global process as an articulated historical product
(modernization), and those which must be associated to one of its components
(capitalism). To attribute to the latter the responsibility of a phenomena that
actually corresponds to the former would be to fall into the pars pro toto
fallacy. (This is what various Marxists schools, for example, have often done
when they have associated individualism, social anomie, or territorial
imbalance to the capitalist mode of production, without considering, however,
the possible relation of these phenomena to socialism).
In Schumpeter's arguments about capitalism and its evolution we
find this fallacy, and on occasions, running the risk of inferring excessive
extrapolations about the future of capitalism -or about the absence of its
future- from what he considers its "observable tendencies". Without attempting
to be exhaustive, and avoiding strict economic science arguments, some of
the aspects that, according to Schumpeter, affect the "cultural contradictions of
capitalism" are:
1) The Process of Creative Destruction. Capitalism cannot be
stationary. It revolutionizes the economic structure "from within", destroying
what went before through a process of competition that affects costs as much
as quality. Creativity in consumer goods, methods of transport, of production,
systems of organization, search for markets and technology. It is a process
that undermines traditional supports existing at a given moment, weakening its
own system. Moreover, capitalism devitalizes the idea of "property" (the
existence of great and small shareholders).
II) Rationality. Capitalism encourages rationality in behaviour.
Rationality involves, on the one hand, the "maximization" of particular interests
of individuals and groups, the use of the instrumental means in a coherent
form, and in the same way a series of readaptations empirically controlled by a
procedure of flawed-testing. On the other hand, rationalization rushes into both
private life and cultural forms. Children are not now economic assets,
hedonism and consumption have substituted saving and the previous "worldly
ascetism" (Weber). Consumption wins against accumulation, diminishing the
desireability of incomes above a certain level.
At the same time, however, when the breaks of certain values
associated with ethical or religious tradition fail (the sophrosyne), irrational
components of behaviour that are critical for capitalism emerge and can not be
refuted with rational arguments, especially when based on long term
considerations.
III) The Obsolescence of the Entrepreneurial Function. Increasing
difficulties for the classical function of management. Increasing importance of
specialized groups. The context, moreover, has been accustomed to change
and each time a greater number of factors are calculable. The success of
business ends up in removing the owners.
IV) Protecting Strata . In the modern era there was a symbiosis
between the nobility and the productive sectors. The former occupied the
State organization, guided political decisions and supplied officials for the
army (the bourgeoisie was only sometimes in charge of local administration). It
was a sector that survived the social and technical conditions that produced it.
In conclusion: the bourgeoisie is politically defenceless without the protection
of non-bourgeoisie sectors, but capitalism, however, encourages the breaking
up of the precapitalist framework of society.
V) Intellectuals. Characterized as those who exercise the power of
the spoken and written word, they are used to not having any direct
responsibility in practical matters and thus, they lack a direct knowledge of
experience. They encourage self-conceived attitudes as "critical", more from a
logic of opposition, we could say, than from a logic of government (Similar to
the role of the demagogues in the Athenian Assembly at the end of V C.b.C.).
There exists a parallel between education and the scale of moral values in the
intellectual sectors and the administrative or bureaucratic sectors against the
values and technical criteria of the economic system as it operates.
In Schumpeter's work these five arguments supporting the concept
of the process of self-destruction of capitalism are put in the shadow of the
feasible substitution by socialism. Presumibly, the same phenomena would
have been treated in a different way if one contemplated the reality of
"emptiness", that Schumpeter rejects, or if one maintained that there was no
other alternative to capitalism than capitalism itself. In this last case, for
example, the process of Creative Destruction could transform a handicap into
a virtue. If what is changed is the type of capitalism more than the type of
economic system the question would not consist so much in seeing whether
this process occurs, but in seeing to what point it is capable of finding
instruments to adapt to social reality. And it seems beyond all reasonable
doubt that capitalist systems find these instruments more easily than socialist
systems do. To sum up, the negation of a particular type of capitalism does
not imply the negation of capitalism as a system. Here Schumpeter's
arguments fall into the fallacy of hasty generalization.
On the one hand, it also seems a little partial to maintain that it is
capitalism which promotes "rationality" in behaviour. Rather it is an attitude
linked to modernization and its technical components, whose consequences
must be seen within the inherent ambiguities that modernization presents from
an emancipatory point of view. It is understood that the moral values that
influence a process of emancipation undermine at the same time the ideas
and values that ensured sociopolitical stability. (Something similar happened
in the process of Athenian "Enlightenment" in the V C.b.C.). But currently this
is a phenomenon related more to postmodernity than to postcapitalism.
On the other hand, from the crisis of the great ideologies that
claimed to have global explanations of social reality, and of the appropriate
therapies for its main problems, we can agree that today we find ourselves
immersed in a new process of individualization. We know that the first modern
Enlightenment substituted religious faith with another faith, the faith of reason
(scientific, historical, political, etc.), but in the second half of the present
century we are witnessing another turn of the screw in this process. There
currently exists greater ethical autonomy -and, thus, a greater disorientation-
with respect to the secular guidelines of that first modern emancipating
movement. Today the individual no longer has to consider attaining a life after
death but neither does he see a normative ethic ahead that tries to assist in
the advent of some “new man" (of whatever type).
In this way, the fallacy pars pro toto glides constantly in the
Schumpeterian arguments about rationalization, considering it in its technical
meaning as well as ethical. However, the attention he pays to the
extra-rational components of behaviour results in a good antidote to the risks
of the use of the fallacy of abstraction to remind us that these components can
be balanced with difficulty through rational arguments. It should be added that
those periods in which the effectivity of these ideas and values that “cement"
sociopolitical organization continue to be questioned. That is to say, in those
periods in which cultural contradictions of the present system appear.
Something similar could be said of the analysis of the entrepreneurial
function presented by Schumpeter. The capitalist evolution has effectively
dislodged a kind of "old" manager in some productive sectors. However,
Schumpeter's conclusion results in an excessively wide application. More than
facing the fallacy of pars pro toto  we are facing a hasty generalization of an
"intuitive" character, based on little evidence. It is a functional re-adaptation
rather than a decline.
Another valid intuition of Schumpeter (but again he goes beyond
what seems conceptually and empirically reasonable) is that of seeing which
differences between liberal logic, on the one hand, and democratic and social
logic on the other, in capitalism's relations with the traditional protecting strata,
intellectuals and Administration. Indeed, neither bureaucracies nor intellectuals
(in a greater sense) are presided over by the logic of the first economic
liberalism, which understood the social coexistence from the individualist
perspective of private property and freedom of the market and which
advocated, moreover, a harmony between private interests and general
welfare. It is understood that social perspective unites the followers of
ideologically very different positions, such as Conservatives and Socialists, in
the criticism of the practical consequences of the capitalist process as put
forward by liberal premises. However, also in reference to this point, the
Scumpeterian conclusions appear at the very least exaggerated, if not
unfocused. One thing to be said is that intellectual logic is similar to the classic
demagogue (for example, that of the Athenian Clio in the War of the
Peloponesus narrated by Thucydides), this logic being based on the
maximization of specific values and interests without considering any criteria
of technical application and practical incompatibility of other values and criteria
that are also desirable. And another thing one can conclude is that
intellectuals must necessarily undermine the basis of the economic system
(Although many of the intellectuals find themselves working outside the ambit
of the market, for example in public Administration, a position that facilitates
their ability to present themselves as defenders of the "public interest"). In
whatever case, this is a question that must be remitted to detailed studies of
an empirical nature like those that have been carried out in relation to
decision-making processes and implementation of public policies during the
1980s (3).
To sum up, in Schumpeter's arguments we observe the existence of
the pars pro toto fallacy in relation to the processes of rationalization and
destruction of protecting strata, while in the analysis of the process of "creative
destruction", of the obsolescence of the entrepreneurial function and the role
of the "intellectuals" and the bureaucracy, the fallacy of the hasty
generalization is present.
Anyway, it is important to remember that Schumpeter's arguments
about capitalism do not facilitate the reasoning that we have characterized as
fallacy of abstraction, with the possible exception of some aspects of the
process of creative destruction. When he deals with economic or cultural
questions his conception possesses a clear methodological vocation that
connects it with the empirical world. His categories are not inclined to
over-theorising on ethical or philosophical terms that try to be more
explanatory as well as more abstract, and which, lacking empirical and
practical sense in many cases cause it to have practically no informative
value. Schumpeter's work implicitly claims the criteria of Popperian falsability
in order that some of its central theses can be refuted (as has happened on
various occasions).
The following table is a summary review of Schumpeter's arguments:
Table1
(1.2)
From Schumpeter's reflections about socialism we only want to note
here two aspects and a final consideration. Firstly, the inevitable
over-theorising that his "intuitions" carry about the supposed systemic
integration and social integration of the socialist economic organization. It
would seem that once a certain level of industrial development is achieved and
once the inherent problems of the period of transition are overcome the
alleged economic efficiency of socialism and its greater level of functional
rationality would be imposed by a type of immanent logic of the historical
evolution. The sudden ups and downs of capitalism could be avoided, the
central planning would complete the process of the managerial concentration
of the great productive units, it would no longer be facing the contradictions
between the public and private fields, etc.
Moreover it would hopefully, according to Schumpeter, result in a
greater ethical loyalty on behalf of the citizens and the intellectuals than in the
previous productive system (4). The hegemonic elites would have a greater
number of instruments with which to carry out policies of an authoritarian style
and to "rationalize" the investments of private savings, and even Schumpeter
does not conceive great difficulties at the time of inserting elements of a
bourgeois origin -as individual initiative- in socialist bureaucracy. This
bureaucracy is conceived, however, as an enormous and inevitable
administrative apparatus, significantly more extensive than current ones.
Secondly, the distinction between the processes of "maturity" and
"immaturity" in transition to socialism do not seem to have the empirical sense
that it would require. In fact, all the real transitions have been "immature".
Schumpeter, following a very classic perspective that has as points of
reference E. Bernstein and M. Weber, is correct in saying that in the
"immature" conditions the socialist system can only be imposed by an
authoritarian system that coercively socializes property and that can impose
without opposition economic centralization. But it is not the most desirable
situation. Although Schumpeter, with Weberian pessimism, coincides with the
socialist reformists in conceiving the process of gradual transition to socialism
as a peaceful phenomenon, almost consensual, when the capitalist condition
is sufficiently "mature". According to this view it would be possible to consider
Schumpeter as the last utopian socialist (or the penultimate, considering the
mythical indestructible capacity of socialism, as P. Berger reminds us. Berger
1986) (5).
Finally, with the collapse of the socialist systems of Eastern Europe
the idea of socialism suffers an inevitable transformation acquiring different
semantic meanings from the traditional ones. Paradoxically, believe that its
strength as a “regulative idea" (in Kantian terms) of social life develops
alongside its lack of precision. This is nothing new. Sometimes it has
happened that however "clear and distinct" an idea has been which has tried
to normatively regulate human relations , the worse it has resisted the passage
of time. In ancient Greece, for example, the concept of diké (justice) evolved
from the aristocratic and religious meaning of the Homeric period to the.
interpretation plurality it had in the crisis of the Athenian democracy during the
wars of the Peloponesus (ending in V century b.C.). The growing strength of
the dik& as a critical idea of denouncing the traditional social and political
order was correlative to the loss of the prior single-minded semantic sense.
From Hesiod to Thucydides its lack of accuracy accompanied its critical
function.
Something similar is presently happening with the idea of socialism.
As we can see in the following section, socialism can no longer present itself
as the monopolizer of contemporary diké, but at most as one of its
components. And as one component among others, it would be necessary for
its particular logic to clarify its relations with other sometimes contradictory
logics of the liberal, democratic in a strict sense, ecological, and functional
components of the present day diké at the end of this century. One can no
longer afirm a utopian diké of a socialist nature against the habitual
pragmatism of political decisions but to found a diké that would be as utopian
as it is pragmatic. And in my opinion, the emancipativ and effective
possibilities of the concept of socialism would come out on top. In short, the
question is to understand socialism as an emancipative contradictory and
complementary component of the others, more than as a real alternative. (This
is one of the ways of understanding socialism more as a "cultural end" than as
an economic system, as T. Bottomore argues in the introduction (1976) to one
of the various Spanish editions of Schumpeter's work (Schumpeter 1984). An
introduction that currently possesses an autonomous historical and theoretical
value).
II. ELITISM AND LIBERAL DEMOCRACY
In this second section I will defend the thesis that the contraposition
of Schumpeter between a "classical doctrine" of democracy and "another
theory" -that we can, describe as elitist or competitive theory- does not
conveniently, result in analytical considerations of conceptual clarification.
And, at least, for two different reasons: on the one hand, because it is a
contraposition that mixes preliberal and liberal conceptions in the notion of
"classical doctrine", a question that becomes an obstacle at the point of
analysing things such as leadership, or the connection between
"participationist" conceptions of democracy and preliberal -and even
premodern- political considerations. On the other hand, and as it is usual with
authors bound to the elitist tradition, because it separates excessively a
"realist" attitude from the normative components of liberal democracies.
In the first place, we note an aspect of the Sdhumpeterian
conception of democracy which follows the political thinking of Max Weber
(II.1) and secondly, we consider Schumpeter' analysis of democratic elitism as
a good basis to understand the limitations of decision-making on having to
combine at least three different dimensions  in liberal welfare state
democracies (II.2).
(II.1)
Schumpeter-Weber
Although he uses more dissemination style, Schumpeter persues the
Weberian analysis about the ambivalence of the Western processes of
bureaucratization and democratization. As it is understood, the link between
both processes with rationalization followed by modern societies is considered
by Weber from an attitude removed from the illustrated naïve conceptions that
were associated with the triumph of "reason" in social relationships and in the
processes of institutionalization and of political decision-making as an
unmistakable and individual emancipative meaning. At the core of this
rationalization there exist however, according to Weber, irrational tendencies
that propitiate hierarchical relationships of an authoritarian type in several
areas (economic, administrative, cultural, etc.) far away from the process of
individual autonomy advocated by the illustrated traditional ideologies, -as
much of a liberal type as a socialist one (6).
In a strictly political frame, the emancipative ambiguities of the
process of Western rationalization established by Weber outline his known
theses about bureaucracy and liberal democracy. In the analitical area this
means that the classic elitist theory and the theoretical basis of liberal
democracies can be articulated. Any study with a realist trend must
understand the practical consequences that the growing complexity and the
process of elitism in institutions and in processes of political decision-making
imply. The triumph of rationalization in this area, that would demand the
subordination of the bureaucracies to the representative political elites, does
not only involve, according to Weber, positive consequences for the
democracies with a liberal core but also carries associated phenomena such
as oligarchic processes in organizations, passivity of the electorate,
charismatic personalization of the leadership, a clear predominance of the
executive, etc. These phenomena were considered by Weber as something
inevitable and irreducible in the preliberal categories of democracy. These
categories still possess an almost exclusive "ethical" character based on
confused notions such as the general will, or on normative desires such as the
participation of the citizens, which are not later developed in terms of
implementation.
In this way, the Weberian conception of democracy immerses part of
its contents in the elitist perspective of the liberal tradition. Constant,
Tocqueville and the American federalists warned about the authoritarian risks
that democratization of the liberal rule of law could represent through the
incorporation of participative rights, especially universal suffrage and the right
of association. However, the Weberian concept of plebiscitary democracy that
correctly signals the evolution of liberal democracies in the first two decades of
the century is not in its turn exempt from ambiguities that can propitiate
interpretations far from the normative basis of these democracies. Bismark is
always present in the background of Weber and, in fact, the object of his
attention was more the phenomenon of leadership than of democracy.
The work of Schumpeter breaks these ambiguities without
renouncing the characterization of democracy as an
"Institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which
individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive
struggle for the people's vote" (CSD 1950:269)
This competitive and elitist characterization eludes the Weberian
ambiguities linking more clearly that "method of decision" to the rules,
regulations, organization principles, and to the language of the rule of law. We
are facing elitism from some unrenounceable pluralist bases. However,
Schumpeter establishes his conception in contrast with a pretended "classical
doctrine" that makes new ambiguities appear.
On the one hand, within this classic theory it results in not
distinguishing between the aliberal participative conceptions of a
Rousseaunian nature (at times even antiliberal “organic" ones) and the
conceptions that make the defense of the liberal core in the organization and
the political rules of the State. This is the condition of possibility of a
representative government based on the individualist perspective of a hostile
acceptance of liberal political power.
On the other hand, the reasoned criticism that Schumpeter puts
forward of “classic" notions such as the "Common Good" and the "Will of the
People" -whether or not they are considered in relation to traditional
Utilitarianism, as Schumpeter did- facilitate thinking about competence for
political leadership of the "another theory" of democracy as a process almost
totally lacking in ethical normativie contents, beyond the functional criteria of
efficiency, efficacy and stability of the political system.
Although this last aspect has been important, deserving a great
number of criticisms by the participation theories in the last two decades
-theories that cannot assume that collective government has to remain, in fact,
in the hands of a small minority-, I think that it is the first aspect that represents
the main analitical handicap of the Schumpeterian conception of democracy
(This will be considered in the next section). Anyway, I believe this conception
represents a good basis for counteracting the risks that often accompany
certain conceptions of the modern philosophical tradition.
.Schumpeter and the philosophical approaches
This tradition was used to put political relations on a horizontal plane.
That is to say it has given priority to the issue of relations between the
individuals of a group -whether they are conceptualized in terms of
cooperation or of egoistical self-affirmation- focusing however much less
attention on the vertical dimension of the relationship between these
individuals and spheres of power, always controlled by minorities that demand
obedience. And this is the strictest political dimension (Pareck 1986). On the
other hand, philosophical discourse was used to put forward arguments
removed from practical and empirical considerations. This has brought with it a
certain tendency towards what we can call “ethicality", understanding it as the
study of political relationships as if they simply were a collective dimension of
the individual ethic, able to be analyzed in the same categories but on a
smaller skill.
This position often loses the focus on the object of political
relationships in democracy because it concentrates much more on the rise of
the demos to the cratos than on the opposite direction of the process of
domination of cratos over the demos (despite the fact that people are
theoretically involved as the source of power). Then it is not surprising that in
the, sphere of philosophy some frustrating attitudes, at the root of
Enlightenment, predominate what are thought to be the "ideal politics" which
are both desirable and unattainable. These attitudes habitually use the kind of
language (Wittgenstein) that propiciates the fallacy of abstraction in theoretical
conceptions, as well as the consolidation of what we can call a logic of
opposition by way of focusing on political questions. That is to say, a
theoretical position developed from outside the responsibilities of government,
which is self-conceived as more "radical" and Ilauthentically emancipating" in
the name of the maximization of particular democratic values, principally
equality and participation (Burnheim 1985), but without considering very much
its empirical applicability or the possible practical contradictions that the
implementation of policies based on those values could assume for other
desirable values, whether of a more preferible ethical nature (liberty, security,
pluralism, etc.) or of a more functional nature (efficiency, efficacy) (7).
Schumpeter's theory allows, therefore, despite its analitical and
normative deficiencies the study of liberal democracies from a political
perspective that avoids the excesses of a horizontal nature and "ethicallity" as
well as the risks linked to the fallacy of abstraction and to the logic of
opposition of certain philosophical theories about democracy. Following Weber
Schumpeter rejects the possibility of reaching generalizations about practical
life without producing sufficient empirical evidence especially when these
generalizations are formulated in the abstract language of the philosophical
tradition. And as Rustow pointed out subsequently in analysing the processes
of transition to liberal democracies, methodologically this meant having to
proceed carefully so as to not confuse correlations with causal explanations in
the area of social sciences (Rustow 1970).
In fact, Schumpeter's conception of liberal democracies represents a
synthesis between some elements of the pluralist paradigm and those of the
classical elitist theory (Held 1987). This is a synthesis that has been
subsequently developed in what is sometimes referred to as the neopluralist
paradigm (Dunleavy-O'Leary 1987) in which certain phenomena noted by
Schumpeter have become the focus of attention: the institutional leadership
and party political leadership, "the systemic" importance of the elitist
democratic quality decision making in cabinets and in parliamentary coalitions,
processes of configuration and aggregation of interests, etc.
Nevertheless, I think that the main risk of the Schumpeterian
"another democracy" is that of "throwing the baby out with the bath water".
Schumpeter is correct n criticizing the naive conceptions of Rousseau and
Bentham -naïvities maintained subsequently by some pluralist or participation
theories- but this is ' a criticism in which it seems that the moral values fade
away from the political analysis. This gives a real presence to other
paradigms, such as the different types of Marxism, the' movements of the
American "new right" or the democratic participation radicalism. One thing is to
show the obsolescence of the legitimating ideas of ethical nature present in
the "classical doctrine" of democracy (supposing that such a theory exists) and
another is to facilitate a normative emptiness in the theoretical foundations of
the "another democracy" (despite Schumpeter's constant implicit references to
normative values). The cultural aspects of empirical democracies seem to
disappear in the name of an "ideal type", the economic theory of democracy,
which in fact only describes partial aspects of liberal democratic states,
(Dahrendorf 1988).
It is in this sense that the contrast between a "democracy as a
method" and a "substantive democracy" -which Schumpeter's theory makes
possible- seems to be another source of confusion. No democracy can
dispense with normative values even if it is presented as a "formal" or method
question. Nor can it dispense with formal or decision-making questions. The
point is rather to decide the coherence between method and normative bases
of the different democracies from ethical and technical criteria and principles.
This last aspect is related, moreover, to the handicap noted
previously: the descriptive and prescriptive risks associated to the lack of
distinction between preliberal and liberal requirements in the "classical
doctrine" (I think that Carole Pateman was correct when she stated some
years ago that to continue talking about a "classical doctrine" that
encompasses such different authors as Locke, Bentham and Rousseau
constitutes an absurd exercise perpetuated, among other things, by the
repetition of those that oppose the elitist theory of democracy from a more
normative than analitical position. C. Pateman 1970) (8).
Schumpeter rejects the "ethicist" pretensions of the classic theory of
democracy, but he continues to talk about a contrast between the classic
democracy and a competitive and representative democracy. This makes
possible the interpretation of the latter as an "imperfect" democracy, because it
does not allow an effective participation of the citizens in the decisions in
which they are involved. According to the preliberal rousseaunian version of
the classic conception, the fact that citizens are outside of the decisional
processes has to be based only on technical considerations, but not on the
liberal approach of the convenient independence of the political elites respect
to the citizens (or the constituents).
On the grounds of this flaw in Schumpeter's theory can find the
opposite position -very widespread but, according to my view, erroneous
historically and conceptually-between a "direct democracy" and a
"representative (or indirect) democracy", both presented as two different
versions of the same class of political organization.
In fact, the heart of the western political organizations has not been
democratic but liberal during the last two centuries. The representative
government, which has grown from political liberalism, does not constitute and
"indirect" or “imperfect" form of the "self-government of the people”. Even
recently when some democratic elements (universal suffrage rights of
association parties of masses etc.) have been grafted on its organizational
principles the institutional and decisional logic of the representative
government continues to be extremely different from a political system based
on a so-called "popular-will". In this point the Madison's lucidity -in thinking of
the representative government as something extremely different and more
desirable than democracy (Federalist 10)- seems clearer and conceptually
better than Schumpeter's approach.
(11.2)
From the foregoing, I believe it is convenient to return to the more
"classic" comparison between a preliberal and a liberal theory of democracy as
two distinct paradigms (in a Kuhnian sense) in which different programmes of
research (in a Lakatos sense) are developed (9).
Naturally, the political, economic, and cultural context of present day
democracies is very different from that of the period of Constant and
Tocqueville. However, the powerful idea of the distinction between ancient and
modern liberty continues to be one of the basic criteria of demarcation of the
paradigms of democracy (10). Briefly, and as has been noted many times,
from the distinct notion of liberty that we adopt we obtain different democracies
(Berlin 1988, Sartori 1987, Bobbio 1984).
Different ethical dimensions within liberal democracies
It is in this way that current liberal democracies can be understood
as historical products of an equilibrium between various autonomous
dimensions or components: liberal, strictly democratic, and social dimensions
that are found controlled by different kinds of logic but whose articulation has
demonstrated a particular stability in the empirical sphere. (This argument
finds itself far removed from the preliberal theory of democracy which does not
distinguish between these components and its different internal logic). This
articulation has been produced however from the liberal core of the
organization of political power (negative liberties, separation of powers,
principle of legality, etc.). And it is from this liberal core that we can understand
the possibilities and boundaries of democracies that assume this as their main
organizational basis.
In the same way that the first political liberalism was non-
democratic, even anti-democratic, the logic of the positive liberties of the
democratic dimension based strictly on the values of equality and citizen
participation is foreign to liberal principles. Neither negative liberty nor
separation of powers nor the principle of legality are in a strict sense aspects
of the democratic attitude. (For example, the fact that citizens have to rely on
protective measures with respect to what social majorities can decide in a
particular moment is a requirement that pertains to the liberal dimension and
that is, however, foreign to the strict democratic dimension).
So, we can state that liberal democracies have no vocation to
become political democracies, that is to say, systems that try to maximize their
strictly democratic dimension. Liberal democracy is rather established as an
alternative system to all the other attempts to construct a "true political
democracy". And it is based on the articulation -historically and empirically full
of tensions- between different kinds of logic (initially between two unique types
of logic, the liberal and the democratic). And we must bring ourselves back to
the practical ground to see how the values and rules of both dimensions are
going to articulate themselves in such a way that neither cancels out the other
(11).
And here Schumpeter reappears. As well as the liberal democracies
of the industrialized countries cannot prevent themselves from being elitist and
competitive. Because of this Schumpeter is correct in criticizing the “classical
doctrine" understood as a democratic theory of a non-liberal nature. That is to
say, as a theory based on the values and organizational principles of the
strictly democratic dimension and which leaves aside the liberal perspective.
Something similar happens when the liberal and democratic
dimensions aggregate themselves into a new dimension, the social (above all
in the postwar period). Although more related to the democratic dimension
than to the liberal, the social component is endowed with an autonomous logic
irreducible from the latter two (Requejo 1990). It represents the third element
of the present concept of citizenship in European liberal democracies
(Barbalet 1988) and a new step in the process of modernization of Western
societies. Based on the values of socioeconomic equality security associated
with the diffuse concept of welfare it is, as is understood, one component
whose institutional origins can be found in the actions of certain European
states during the last years of the XIX century, states that did not rely on a real
liberal organization (Germany). But it is, at the same time, the key dimension
of the contemporary socialist tradition. And from both perspectives, this
dimension invades the organization principles of liberal democracies.
To mark the autonomy of the social dimension with respect to the
liberal and strictly democratic dimensions means that such non social aspects
of the first liberal democracies and the non liberal democratic aspects of the
social component should be considered (Offe-Preuss 1989). And it also
means considering the difficulty of finding an optimum of the three basic
ethical dimensions in the specific policies as a structural handicap. None of
these dimensions can be found maximized.
Facing this multidimensionality we can see, on the one hand, how in
the area of political science in the post-war period the traditional pluralist
models did not pick up this dimension profoundly. On the other hand, in the
empirical field one cannot deny the political incidence of the confusing
language of the non-liberal conceptions of democracy, especially in an
authoritarian context that tries to impose a liberal democratic system. As is
established in the classical study coordinated by O'Donnell, Schmitter and
Whitehead, the claim of maximizing the different components works towards
the breakdown of an authoritarian system even if subsequently it works in
favour of an inevitable "desencanto" (Schmitter-O'Donnell 1986) (12).
The normative ethical basis of the components of Western liberal
democracies can be expressed in the following way (13):
Table2
Consideration of liberal democracies as a historical product based on
three distinct components, which presently need each other but respond to
different premises and normative interests, seems convenient when we
analyse both the descriptive and prescriptive aspects of the re-location of
Western welfare states since the 1970s (14). The growing internationalization
of decision-making processes, the incidence of new technologies, the
necessary adaptation of public intervention in market mechanisms, the
emergence of more "micro" interventions in comparison with the period of
post-war expansion (1950-1975), the new distributive criteria, the policies of
monetarism and restructuring inefficient productive sectors, the changes in the
processes of rationalization of public administrations, etc, in Schumpeter's
perspective, run the risk of being analysed only as "normative" questions of a
technical nature within the main programmes of research of present day
political science (pluralist, elitist, "new right", cooperatist, etc) leaving aside the
normative aspects of a more ethical nature.
Understanding ambiguities
Specially from the 1980s, the state can no longer be seen as the
only rational decision-maker. The Weberian rationality seems to have diluted a
complexity in which the administrative elites cannot be considered as playing a
subordinate and passive role. Today there are more problems to solve, more
variables to consider, a greater number of private and administrative levels
involved, a greater acceleration in decision-making and it is more difficult to
establish at a particular time what the "public interest" means. After the
emergence of these phenomena it is difficult not to accept that the practical
processes of political decision-making are more hidden and autonomous than
what the traditional rhetoric of liberal democratic states used to accept (or the
pluralist "program of research" of the 1950s and 1960s). And this changes the
meaning of the concept of rationality even when one questions, from different
perspectives, that its concept has remained trapped in its technocratic aspect.
It seems convenient not to separate it from this sense when we talk of
emancipative or "communicative" rationalities (Habermas 1981), if we do not
wish to remain trapped in the contrary perspective, that is, the one that tries to
claim an ethical rationality considered in direct contrast to the technocratic or
instrumental rationality.
In my view, political science and in particular the policy analysis will
have to show in the 1990s the useful sense of a concept of ethical rationality
built from (in stead of being in contrast to) the instrumental rationality. As well
as what happened with the democratic ambiguity of the growing process of
bureaucratization -an ambiguity that made this process at times an obstacle to
the democratization process and an essential condition for the extension of the
"democratization" welfare policies'-, the process of growing technocratic
consideration also possesses similar ambiguities in relation to some political
systems that attempt to articulate the liberal, democratic and social
components in the most coherent structure possible.
Schumpeter's theory encourages to jump to conclusions about the
rational character of the ethical values (in spite of the ethical background of his
own conception). The recent emergence of political theories with a strong
normative component -especially since Rawls's work- seems to refute that
conclusion. However, I think it continues to be an important point of reference
at the moment to understand the ambiguities or the "ethical" and "functional"
shadows that whatever political practice are carried away (universal suffrage
appeals to selfish motives, participation appeals to manipulation, etc).
These ambiguities and shadows to be marginalised, for instance, by
the contemporary ethics of communication, in spite of its sensitivity towards
pragmatic considerations and the acceptance of dissension. This approach
used to pick up more the linguistic aspect of pragmatism than the political
aspect (Apel 1988). This approach leads to the attempt to reach an impossible
synthesis between the classic democracy and the "other democracy" which
Schumpeter was thinking about. Following the communicative line we can only
arrive at the claim of a “participatory" democracy, in contrast with the desirable
boundaries of liberal democracies.
From my point of view, the question is to find legitimate criteria in
liberal democracies from both, deontological and consequentialist, but with an
explicit consideration of the boundaries imposed on the instrumental
rationality. In this point I think that Rawls goes further than Apel and Habermas
(15).
It is the same concept of the rule of law that must be reconsidered in
the1990s (Gauthier 1990). Even if we assume the concept to be an "ideal
type", the changes in the social conditions relocate the effective limits and
possibilities of this "ideal type", especially from the invasion of the social
dimension in the structures and decision-making proceses of liberal
democracies. But while the liberal core is maintained in the rule of law I do not
think that we are justified in supposing that the paradigm has changed, despite
the efforts of the corporatists and participationists.
Technocratic and bureaucratic processes have consolidated the
autonomy of state in relation to society and of the decision-makers with regard
to representative politics. And these processes have represented some clear
limits for the expansion of the strict democratic dimension within liberal
democracies and for the possibilities of its effective reform (Dahl 1982), as
Schumpeter already suspected. To talk, for example, of "economic
democracy" as a key aspect of the thorough development of democracy is
something residual in the current practice of liberal democracies. In whatever
case it is something that remains distant from any alternative to these
democracies (Adamson 1990) (16). But at the same time, the incorporation of
the social dimension has reinforced the practical uses of the contemporary
rule of law.
The knowledge that we have about the new decision-making
processes is not very precise. Neither is our knowledge of the political impact
of new technology nor of government agencies and the organizations of
interests. But our knowledge of possible articulations between ethical
normative values and principles and technical criteria is smaller still.
Sometimes both have been treated, intuitively, as two separated realities,
even contradictory, with no connection (Lozano 1990). As if after criticizing the
Weberian approaches we must inevitably go back to them (17).
Political theory is readapting itself to the period of cultural
"postmodernity" at the end of this century. We are witnessing the
fragmentation of rationalities which does not seem contradictory, however, to a
more comprehensive interdisciplinary discussion. Liberal democracies are
necessary and paradoxically instrumental ends. And it is the permanent
pressure in the process of compatibility of measures and objectives which
confer the most open character to the reform of these democracies. It seems
that we must look for the outcome of liberal democracies within themselves.
And in this sense, it seems convenient to avoid the realization of utopian
models of an ethical nature which do not reflect its operative applicability as
well as a resigned attitude which explains everything in terms of the "rationality
of the system". (And it would be a temerity to consider liberal democracies as
something irreversible -at least in the Southern European countries in a
historical time when their technological development could mean the
inexistence of second opportunities).
Schumpeter's work constitutes an invitation to work with greater
empirical accuracy but without renouncing to a political theory that is as
comprehensive as possible. And I think that in order to update the normative
-ethical and technical- foundation of liberal democracies it would be
convenient to keep the Schumpeterian "tone" of his "after-dinner chat".
Table1
Table2
NOTES
(1) A rigorous and readable introduction to the analysis of logic, whose first part is written in
the style of a thriller with Sherlock Holmes as the main character, Neblett 1985.
(2) It is understood that in ancient Greece the concept of hybris (excess) evolved from being
associated with the demos during the Homeric period until it was associated with the
concept of "tyranny" in the following centuries. For its part, the sophrosyne was an ideal of
rational measurement of self-control, as opposed to the hybris, which in the political sphere
was expressed in the constitution of Solon (594 B.C.). A Constitution that was the first of
several reforms which ended in the political system of Cleisthenes, Ephialtes and Pericles,
called demokratia by Heroditus.
(3) In these studies it has been noted, for example, the convenience of introducing changes in
public bureaucracies in order to transform the traditional administrative model into one
which encourages the following criteria: 1) rigor in formulating and implementing policies
and control of the results obtained; 2) flexibility in the internal organization which allows the
maximization of initiative and the it “entrepreneurial spirit" in levels of administration; 3)
ability to learn from situations which change more and more rapidly. All this ends in the
introduction of managerial criteria into the conduct of public bureaucracies, a question that
leaves us far from Schumpeter's position of two almost irreconcilable worlds. A first
evaluation of the criteria introduced in administration in Western countries during the
1980s, in the Revue Française d'Administration Publique, n. 51, Paris 1989.
(4) Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis insist on the possibilities of loyalty and accountability on
the part of workers in an “…economic democracy": "economic democracy, by providing an
alternative to unaccountable hierarchical authority in investment and production, can
promote loyalty, commitment and accountability on the part of workers and those who
control investible resources" (Bowles-Gintis 1986:211).
(5) In this area the fallacies of abstraction and hasty generalization are developed without
hindrance, and the preliminary observation of Schumpeter about the risks of comparing a
real system (capitalism) with a mental image cannot be considered as mitigation. (The
conception of socialism is perhaps the part of his work which best illustrates the
characterization of Schumpeter's work by Elster as an "intelligent after-dinner chat").
(6) A recent attempt to overcome as much the Weberian pessimism as his critics -for example,
Lukacs and the first Frankfurt School which in fact did not overcome that pessimism’s the
work of the "second Habermas". As is understood, his Theorie des Kommunikativen
Handelns tries to defend a theory of rationality based on the post-Wittgenstenian
conceptions of language that makes possible a new normative foundation of the practical
world (ethical and political) that avoids the selective partialities of the process of
rationalization of Western societies denounced by Weber, as much as the ineffectiveness
or the abyss between theory and practice that show Adorno's and Horkheimer's
conceptions and the traditional Marxism, respectively. In my view, the ambitious approach
of Habermas and the exhaustive and refined analitical material employed is in contrast to
the results finally obtained (Requejo 1991).
(7) In this sense we can see, for instance, J. Burheims's concept of "demarchy" as an
alternative model to "democracy" ("that does not exist in practice"). This “demarchy" is
characterised by: 1) A "statistical representation" whose representatives are not elected by
people. More or less as in the ancient Greek practice of leadership selection (It is not clear
how represented can control their representatives); 2) Decision-making is composed of
several autonomous bodies, and not of a centralized government (It is not clear, then, how
the problems of a necessary coordination can be solved); 3) The ambits of decision-making
are created by functional rather than territorial criteria.
(8) A more recent example: the existence of a pretended “postliberal democracy" (Bowles-
Gintis 1986).
(9) We do not use here the more restrictive meaning of the concept of political paradigm
employed by Raschke, Brand and Offe, which allows a distinction between an "old" and a
"new" paradigm in liberal democracies from the invasion of the "new social movements". In
the words of Offe: "A political paradigm permits answers to interrelated questions such as:
a) What are the main contents and themes of collective action?; b) Who are the actors and
in what way do they become collective actors?; c) What are the appropriate processes,
tactics and institutional methods for dealing with conflict?" (Offe 1988:243 n. 1. Translated
by the author).
 I think the distinction between paradigm and program of research permits a better
classification of different "models" of democracy from a political science point of view. It
allows, for example, the separation of the nine different models argued by D. Held as
subtypes of two basic paradigms: a participation preliberal paradigm (models I, IIIa, IV,
VIII), and a representative liberal paradigm (models II, IIIb, V, VI, and VII) (Held 1987).
(10) In his famous conference of 1819, Constant argued: "But as the liberty that we need is
different from that of the ancient Greeks, this liberty requires a different, organization from
that which was suitable for the ancient liberty. In this the more time and the more energy
that man dedicated to the exercise of his political rights, the more free he believed he was.
In the type of liberty that corresponds to us, this will be more precious when the exercise of
political rights leaves more time to pursue private affairs" (Translated by the author).
(11) In this way, the vacillations of Tocqueville are understandable at the point of
comprehending "democracy" as compatible or not with "liberty" (with the liberal idea of
liberty). Only when socialism appears as a rival in the political organization of the European
countries does it maintain a possible compatibility of "democracy" and "liberty", revising his
previous opinion defended in De la Democratie en Amerique (1835). But in fact the
articulation between liberal and democratic dimensions historically reinforced the rule of
law in the liberal democratic systems (Sartori 1987).
(12) This term comes from the analysis of the Spanish transition in the 1970s, contained in the
study coordinated by O'Donnell, Schmitter and Whitehead (1986).
(13) I have developed this point in a recent book (Requejo 1990).
(14) From the 1980s it could be argued that there exists a fourth dimension, the
Postmaterialist, articulated around the values of autonomy and critical solidarity. It is also a
dimension distinct from the previous ones that comes associated with the "new social
movements" (ecological, pacifist, feminist, etc) defending a clear anti-authoritarian
component in the concept of "citizenship" and of individual emancipation. Following the
American and European movements of the late 1960s, a critical attitude in the face of
uncontrolled production, the technocratic reason and the bureaucratization process, an
attitude that breaks some of the basic precepts of the "society of labour" (Habermas)
implicitly admitted by the conservative, liberal, social-democratic and Marxist organizations.
The political economy is no longer the emancipative science. In this dimension, the cultural
elements displace the centrality occupied by the strictly economic or political elements. It is
not so much it claims what we want to live but how we want to live. In this sense, it is a
change with regard to how the quality of life should be understood. Anyway, the
weaknesses of these movements can be described as follows: their link to a strict logic of
opposition around a single claim considered "non negotiable" (Offe), the analitical
deficiences in which the fallacy of abstraction is very often present, an attitude of
"ethicality" that marginalizes the technocratic aspect of rationality. All this makes the
postmaterialist dimension appear to be surrounded by difficulties at the point of influencing
the policies of the three “classical" components of liberal democracies since the Second
World War.
(15) In this sense I think that Apel's pretensions of making a “rational reconstruction of the
universal foundations of ethics" (in a kantian perspective) has sense -in spite of some
"postmodern" positions-, however in the strict political sphere his theory has inherent
limitations. He needs to put together two different rational logics, the instrumental and
ethics, and within the latter he would need to consider different aspects endowed with its
own autonomy (liberal, democratic, social, an postmaterialist) that in practice surfaced
sometimes as contradictory. In Kohlberg's theory -which I do not think considers with
accuracy the social and emotive components presents in moral reasoning- I think that the
political area can be placed at most in the 5 1/2 stage within the postconventional level,
even in the liberal democracies. This stage is simply superior to stage 6 (or to the
Habermas's 7th stage) in the antinomic sphere of politics. The democratization of a society
is something extremely different from the fact that the political system of this society has to
be only "democratic". (This question is sometimes confused in Apel and Habermas's work,
in contrast with Schumpeter's approach).
(16) I agree with G. Sartori that participation theories have to explain how and to what point
their claims can invade liberal democracies when they have already accepted the liberal
organizational bases of liberal democratic political systems. That is to say, when these
bases have been accepted as the necessary condition for the existence of “other" kinds of
democracies in specific and minor areas. But, unfortunately, this is not an attitude normally
expressed in these theories which still want to reconcile the categories of "man" and
"citizenship" in a political democracy, not as structurally limited as liberal democracies.
(17) Weber's distinction between an ethic of conviction and an ethic of responsibility is today a
classic reference in the arguments about relationships between ethics and politics. As is
understood, the ethic of conviction establishes not only the private behaviour of an
individual but also the public behaviour: it must adapt itself to the moral convictions that it
maintains independently from what are the consequences derived from the action. The
ethic of responsibility, however, defends the position that behaviour must consider these
consequences before being undertaken. And it would seem, at least in liberal democracies,
the ethic of responsibility is more plausible than the ethic of conviction (as Weber argued).
Fundamentally for two reasons. In the first place, the ethic of conviction is much less
sensitive to the empirical focuses and practical considerations, always more complex and
plural than the "principles" that try to regulate them. (It is a much more a "Socratic"
approach than Aristotelian, which tends to advocate a series of "pure" policy-makers who
are not very pragmatic and somewhat doctrinal). In the second place, and this is the
essential thing, the "moral convictions" of a person are used to present themselves as
contradictory when they try to implement them in reality. Moral values located on a similar
level of an axiological foundation are antagonistic in their application, and probably the
fallacy of abstraction appears once again. Nevertheless, the risk of the ethic of
responsibility is complementary. It is the classic risk of instrumentalism. To sum up, one
should try to adapt the convictions making them more sensitive to the systemic world, that
is to say, to the prevailing logic in the practical sphere in order that the responsibilities can
be effectively ethical responsibilities. In other words, one should pragmatically readjust the
convictions to ethically relocate the responsibilities.
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